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Abstract
This article discusses the place of modality as a pragmalinguistic phenomenon in 
communication and the implications of such an investigation for contrastive discourse 
analysis. It proposes an alternative three-dimensional model of modality, the construc-
tion of which is possible through the addition of the affective load of an utterance as 
a separate variable related to speech modalisation and the assumption that dynamic 
modality is, in fact, correlated with deontic modality, at least on a prepositional level. 
The article also discusses the problems when contrastively analysing modality reali-
sation. It highlights that the large number of cross-cultural nuances found in modal 
devices reflects the enormity of analytic difficulties with which a researcher is likely 
to be faced.
1. Introduction
Teaching English as a Foreign Language to advanced learners has its apparent advan-
tages. The teacher is no longer restricted to just initiating the learner into the world 
of L2 communication through, for example, introducing a narrow and predictable 
patch of systemic knowledge. The teacher can finally help the students explore the 
vast territories of language use and instruct them on the authentic application of 
the acquired knowledge in genuinely communicative contexts. There is, however, 
a downside to these new opportunities. Orienting the learner within the intricacies 
of authentic communication places an obligation upon the teacher to clearly com-
prehend the numerous pragmalinguistic phenomena, so as to appropriately (which 
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in classroom contexts translates into: automatically) respond to a communicative 
predicament. These problematic complexities include the nuances of language use 
as well as a wide range of discourse making, together with speech modalisation, 
which this article investigates. It shows that to coherently understand this complex 
communicative phenomenon, it may be necessary to abandon the abstraction of 
many theories on the use of modality and instead view modality from a new, mul-
tidimensional perspective. 
Definitions of modality are aplenty. And this is unsurprising since the phe-
nomenon encroaches on the territory of both philosophy (including modal logic) 
and linguistics (including pragmatics). In philosophy it is often broadly viewed as 
“consisting in the relativization of the validity of sentence meanings to a set of pos-
sible worlds” (Keifer 1994: 2515a). In linguistics it is considered to refer to “a speaker’s 
attitude towards, or opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed by a sentence” 
(Simpson 2005: 43), although its meaning can and should be extended onto “their at-
titude towards the situation or event described by a sentence” (Simpson 2005: 43). 
The two areas naturally intertwine, which results in many researchers attempting 
to either refine their own, or other’s models, or to put forward new classifications. 
Consequently, today’s linguistics has to grapple with numerous, yet often inconclu-
sive, theories on modality use.
The literature is teeming with voices of dissent. Researchers do not even agree as 
to the actual bounds of modality in communication. For instance, some differentiate 
between a speaker’s stance and modality or modality and evidentionality, whereas 
others argue that every utterance through which a speaker expresses their stance 
on the conveyed message falls within the immense realm of modality. In fact, the 
latter approach is close to the spirit of this article in which I will nevertheless attempt 
to propose certain modifications within such a broad perception of modality.
It is not occasional that contrastive analyses, difficult to verify especially in spoken 
contexts, pose serious difficulties to the researcher. In addition, the nuances and 
variability of spoken L2 production, whether containing linguistic inappropriacies 
or marked idiosyncratically, constitute a challenge of great magnitude, sometimes 
even skirting the edge of infeasibility. This problem is outlined in the second sec-
tion of the article, after my proposition of a coherent multidimensional model of 
modality has been presented.
2. Models of modality 
There is a problem facing linguistics regarding modality as a communicative phe-
nomenon. On the one hand, numerous attempts to objectify the phenomenon 
result in much research and many classifications, and consequently do provide 
insight into how speakers really express their stance on a certain matter. Some 
stick to the traditional deontism-epistemism dichotomy, whereas others attempt 
to give these phenomena new labels that are easily understood, such as “extrinsic” 
for “epistemic” or “intrinsic” for “deontic” (Biber 1999 et al.) or “root” for “deontic” 
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and “dynamic” modalities (Facchinetti 1998: 61). Some refer to the realm of modal-
ity more philosophically as “possible worlds” (Keifer 1994: 2515a, Chrzanowska-
-Kluczewska 2009), whereas others single out as many as 12 (Coates 1983) or even 
17 modalities (Mindt 1998: 45). On the other hand, these intricate analyses move 
the discussion of what remains a pragmatic and meaningful element of commu-
nication onto a level of severe abstraction and may paradoxically be detrimental 
to a constructive understanding of modality, for instance, from the perspective 
of applied linguistics. 
It is not possible to discuss all the research into modality in one article, yet it 
is possible to illustrate the difficulties in such studies. Such an attempt will be un-
dertaken in this section, drawing on the models of modality proposed by Simpson 
(2005) and Palmer (2003). 
The model proposed by Simpson (2005: 43) posits that modality comprises “the de-
ontic system, along with the closely related boulomaic system”, as well as “the epistemic 
system with its subsystem of perception modality.” In this model deontic modality is 
seen as being “concerned with a speaker’s attitude to the degree of obligation attach-
ing to the performance of certain actions” (Simpson 2005: 43), boulomaic with an 
expression of ‘desire’ (Simpson 2005: 43), which is often realised through the use of 
verbs such as hope, wish or regret. The other strand of the model, epistemic modality, 
is defined as being related to “the speaker’s confidence or lack of confidence in the 
truth of a proposition expressed” (Simpson 2005: 44) with a subcategory, percep-
tion modality, considered to be “predicated on some reference to human perception, 
normally visual perception” (Simpson 2005: 46). The latter is thus realised through 
adjectives or adverbs, such as clear/clearly, apparent/apparently or evident/evidently. 
The following table illustrates the model:
Modalsystem Non-linguistic concepts represented
Selected linguistic devices
used
DEONTIC obligation, duty, commitment obliged, permitted, forbidden
BOULOMAIC desire hope, wish, regret, regrettable, hopefully
EPISTEMIC knowledge, belief, cognition must, certain/certainly, necessarily, think, believe, suppose, supposedly
PERCEPTION perception obvious/obviously, clear/clearly, ap-parent/apparently, evident/evidently
Table 1. Simpson’s (2005: 47) classification of modality
The above classification of modality is problematic. It differentiates between deontic 
and boulomaic modality, though in fact there is no clear-cut distinction, if any, be-
tween, for instance, the deontic commitment and the boulomoic desire. The various 
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non-linguistic concepts could be classified as belonging to deontic modality alone, 
but positioned on a gradeability scale according to their deontic power. The deontic 
power of a given device would be dependent upon its expectancy effect, that is the 
degree of likelihood that the desired act will actually be performed.
This approach could equally well apply to the epistemic certainly and the per-
ceptive evidently, especially in analysing modality in spoken contexts. After all, 
speakers often use either device unconsciously and, therefore, placing them in two 
separate categories might be regarded as unjustified. The problem can also be seen 
in an analysis of the following modality marker:
This action was apparently successful.
It could be suggested that in the above sentence the perceptive apparently could be 
replaced with the epistemic certainly, with no detrimental effect to the semantics 
of the message. In fact, it would not be surprising if in spoken contexts speakers 
used these adverbs interchangeably, since in informal speech many words lose their 
original meaning as a result of “a semantic shift for the nonce” (Krzyszpień 2013). 
Other models of modality are also based on the deontic-epistemic dichotomy, al-
though some choose to add new categories or subcategories to those already existing. 
For example, Palmer (2003: 7) asserts that in the English language system one can 
distinguish three kinds of modality: epistemic, deontic and dynamic. In this model 
epistemic modality is “concerned solely with the speaker’s attitude to status of the 
proposition” (Palmer 2003: 7), whereas deontic and dynamic modality types “relate 
directly to the potentiality of the event” (Palmer 2003: 7), with deontic modality refer-
ring to permission or obligation as an external control and dynamic modality realis-
ing the internal ability or willingness of the person to perform a certain action as, for 
example, in the sentence They can run very fast (Palmer 2003: 7). 
And indeed, dynamic modality is a separate modality world, which seems to 
have been ignored in Simpson’s model. And thanks to its covert relation to deontic 
modality, discussed in subsequent parts of this article, it is possible to refine the per-
ception of modality as realised through the multidimensionality of its structure. 
3. Model of modality: an alternative
The aforementioned models appear to have one problem in common. Sound as they 
are, they exclude from modality devices that realise a significant aspect of the speaker’s 
attitude, namely the affective load of an utterance, for instance in afraid, as contrasted 
with the non-affective think, or suspect, as opposed to the non-affective suppose. Af-
ter all, there is a difference between I think it is small and I’m afraid it is small, and 
the difference lies not only in whether the devices belong to the world of deontic or 
epistemic modality, but also in the very affective load contained within the utterance. 
This phenomenon is not included in either of the above models of modality, and in 
general appears to be ignored in the discussion of modality as a whole.
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3.1. Two-dimensional model
The most problematic aspect of the proposed models of modality most likely derives 
from the fact that it is sometimes impossible to assign a single non-linguistic concept, 
realised by a single linguistic device, to a specific modal category. There would, how-
ever, be no difficulty in one category overlapping with another if it did not obscure 
the picture of the whole classification and, consequently, the discussion of modality 
types, at times exposing it to a level of criticism. Such difficulties may result from 
the fact that the proposed classifications take a one-dimensional form. A proposal 
which could simplify and clarify the discussion would be to extend the model onto 
a second dimension, to treat modalities not through separate non-linguistic concepts, 
but through degrees of modality in relation to the affective load of the utterance, 
as illustrated below:
Figure 1. 2-D model of modality
This gradable perception of modality could translate into treating, for instance, the 
non-linguistic obligation as the strongest and hope as the weakest degree of deontic 
modality, due to their expectancy effect, as well as must/evidently as the strongest and 
may/perhaps as the weakest degree of epistemic modality. Determining the precise 
position of a given non-linguistic concept on a gradable scale of modality is open 
to interpretation, yet the general idea of modal gradeability seems reasonable. 
Another significant feature of the proposed model is its two-dimensionality, 
which is achieved through extending the model of modality by the addition of a fur-
ther variable: the affective load of the utterance. Thanks to this it is possible to place 
a given device not only in any position along the scale of the two main categories, 
namely epistemic or deontic, but also in any proximity to the second dimension of 
modality, that is the affective load of a modal device. An example is given below:
 a) (non-modal) It’s good.
 b) (modal) It’s really good.
The adverb really may be interpreted as only conveying epistemic content through 
referring to one’s reality (1). Yet, it can also be seen as an emphatic device (2), es-
pecially in spoken output. It will still be interpreted as being epistemic, although 
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it will be placed in a lower position on the scale, still with a greater affective load. 
Its proposed position in the 2-D model might be as follows:
Figure 2. Position of modal devices in 2-D model of modality
The same applies to the following deontic markers:
 a) You have to do it. (deontic: 3.7; affect: 0.8)
 b) I hope you do it. (deontic: 0.9; affect: 3.8)
The deontic have to is classified as a strong obligation and, therefore, is positioned 
on the deontic scale towards the extreme 4. At the same time, if, for instance, the 
speaker was in a managerial role giving instruction to their employees, the affective 
load would be low, hence the position of have to on the affective scale towards zero. 
Simpson’s boulomaic hope, classified as having lower deontic power, is positioned on 
the deontic scale toward zero and on the affective scale towards the extreme four.
3.2. Three-dimensional alternative
Despite this, the 2-D model fails to include dynamic modality, which would rightly 
expose it to criticism. And again, as a simple remedial procedure another variable 
can be added, this time under the heading of modality type (Palmer’s dynamic 
modality), which could constitute a third dimension. This can be accomplished 
providing that the dynamic modality can “interact” with either of the other two 
modalities. Although at a level this is not the case, as the following example dem-
onstrates, deontic modality can assumptively or prepositionally include dynamic 
modality.
You have to run faster.
The sentence could no doubt be interpreted as carrying a deonticly modal value, since it 
expresses an obligation imposed on the subject. Yet, at the same time, it carries the logi-
cal assumption that the subject is capable of running faster, which represents dynamic 
modality. Therefore, in the 3D model the position of have to would be as follows:
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Figure 3. 3-D model of modality
The modal values of have to, then, could be specified as 3.7 for its deontic obligation, 
3.5 for its dynamic capability and 0.8 for its affective load.
3.3. Modality multidimensionality: final remarks
The above proposition to include the affective load of an utterance at least as a specific 
value of a given modality type is based on the assumption that the affective load of 
the utterance automatically determines that it falls into the realm of modality, al-
though modality is not excluded without it. In the sentence It’s beautiful, the speaker 
expresses their stance on the aesthetics of a given object and the affective “beautiful” 
represents the modal value of the utterance, dependant upon the interpretation: 
deontic as a subcategory of “wish” (I wish it wasn’t less beautiful) or epistemic as an 
expression of the speaker’s opinion. Similarly, if a person says It’s red it is interpreted 
as specifying the colour alone, and thus is viewed as being non-modal, unless the 
speaker is asked about the colour in specific circumstances as, for instance, when it 
is difficult to determine. However, the addition of I’m afraid affectively marks the 
message and thus determines the modal value of the utterance. On the other hand, 
the speaker’s addition of I think, instead of I’m afraid carries no affective load but 
still determines its epistemicly modal value. This suggests that an affective load is 
a determinant of modality value, though it is not a necessary condition of modality.
The proposed three-dimensional model appears to offer an alternative to tradi-
tional perceptions of modality systems. On the one hand, it simplifies the interpre-
tation of modalisation only to three categories, yet on the other hand it moves the 
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discussion to a higher level of abstraction, which should nonetheless help in a suc-
cessful conceptualisation of the phenomenon. It should still be realised, however, 
that modality as a pragmalinguistic or paralinguistic phenomenon, will always pose 
difficulties to the researcher, especially if analysed cross-culturally.
4. Other modality-related problems 
Understanding modality poses problems other than those regarding the inclusion 
of the affective load of the message in a modality system, addressed in the previous 
section. Another question which needs to be answered is whether modality and evi-
dentiality should be seen as separate phenomena or whether evidentiality should be 
treated as a subcategory or an extension of modality. According to Wiemer (2006: 10), 
for instance, evidentiality is a reference to the source of the speaker’s knowledge, 
and consequently, the phrase people say would not be classified as modality but as 
evidentiality. A similar view is held by Rytel (1982: 18), who asserts that reporting 
other people’s judgements is additional non-modal information. That proposition, 
however, differs from Koseska-Toszewa’s (1993: 157) stance, who argues that reporting 
hearsay is linked to imperceptiveness, which is included in modality, and in Polish 
is realised through modal devices such as mówią, że; powiadają, że or podobno, 
ponoć as well as rzekomo or jakoby (Wiemer 2006: 15). 
Another problem related to the ongoing discussion is the relation between hedges 
and modality in communication. Coates (1983: 49), for instance, asserts that “epistemic 
modality is always a hedge”, a claim which might be easily challenged if a hedge is 
defined not as a stance-marker or a down-toner, but as a gap-filler having no content 
value, used exclusively in instances of communication breakdown. After all, the use of 
a hedge as an element of strategic competence will not necessarily materialise in mo-
dalising the utterance, but in simply maintaining the fluency of the communication.
A question regarding the essence of modality and, consequently, whether sepa-
rate modality devices can indeed be singled out must also be addressed. Although 
linguistics does specify “a variety of grammatical means for conveying modal com-
mitment, amongst which are included modal auxiliaries, modal adverbs (or sentence 
adverbs), evaluative adjectives and adverbs, generic sentences and verbs of knowledge, 
prediction and evaluation” (Simpson 2005: 43), modality without doubt exceeds the 
bounds of grammatical representations and encroaches upon prosody or phonol-
ogy, where it might be at least difficult to determine and consequently categorise 
possible modalisations.
5. Difficulties with Polish v. English modality realisation analyses
Contrastive analyses usually inject an additional element into an investigation of 
language use. Yet, they may prove challenging especially when the analysis concerns 
language subtleties and nuances, often bound culturally and paralinguistically. 
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A contrastive analysis of modality is no exception, with problems revolving mainly 
around finding or comparing the equivalents of a given modality device, as in the 
following example: 
Marek podobno już przyjechał.
‘Reportedly/supposedly, Marek has already come to town. (Wiemer 2006: 11)
Notwithstanding the questionable addition of to town in the English translation, the 
problem is in the use of reportedly/supposedly as equivalents of podobno. Not only 
do the sentence positions of these modal adverbs differ, but they also belong to a dif-
ferent register. Podobno is an informal modal adverb, whereas reportedly/supposedly 
seem to be used mainly in formal communicative contexts. In addition, supposedly 
implies that the assumption concerning Marek’s arrival has been made on rather 
inconclusive grounds.
Another problem will be illustrated in the following example:
Ponoć pałują naszych. Wchodzimy!
I hear they’re clubbing our people. We’re going in! (Korytkowska, Roszko 1997: 221)
In the above sentence the Polish ponoć was translated into I hear, which actually has 
a perfect Polish equivalent słyszałem. The problem in finding English equivalents of 
modal adverbs such as ponoć or podobno may stem from the possibility that in the 
English language no such equivalents may actually exist. Thus, when translating 
these adverbs into English, other phrases, not necessarily structurally uniform, have 
to be used, as long as they fit into the formality/informality of the context. In the 
above sentences I hear does seem to be an appropriate proposition.
The problem of connotation is illustrated in the following example:
Marek rzekomo już przyjechał.
Allegedly, Marek has already come to town. (Wiemer 2006: 11)
Wiemer (2006: 11) asserts that rzekomo has a negative connotation, as it implies 
Marek may not yet have come. It is a valid comment, yet juxtaposing it with allegedly 
creates further difficulties. Allegedly is a specific modal device in English often used 
to guarantee the neutrality and objectivity of the statement, as in: 
Samuel Jurgens is the Alabama student who was allegedly beaten and robbed by 
members of the Crimson Tide football team.
In fact, the modal adverb in the above example is not intended to express doubt 
regarding the guilt of the possible perpetrators of the crime, but appeals to a pre-
sumption of innocence. Interestingly, until recently in Polish journalistic discourse 
such cases were reported without any modality. Lately, journalistic discourse has 
corrected this problem in reporting arrests and consequently, a modal device miał 
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zrobić (was supposed to) has begun to be used. Still, no direct equivalent of alleg-
edly is applied.
One faces a similar problem when translating niby into supposedly and przecież 
into after all (Wiemer 2006: 18). Interestingly, considerable research has indeed been 
undertaken into the use of the above evidential units, mainly by Wierzbicka, who 
as early as 1971 interpreted the semantics of podobno, rzekomo, jakoby (Wierzbicka 
1971: 110) and in 2006 analysed a large group of epistemic devices. In the case of the 
hearsay adverb allegedly, analysed above, Wierzbicka (2006: 282) maintains that of 
the four hearsay adverbs (apparently, supposedly, allegedly and reportedly), “it is only 
in the case of allegedly that the speaker distances himself or herself totally from the 
statement that is being attributed to someone else,” which supports the above discus-
sion. Besides, Wierzbicka (2006) offers an inspiring discussion of other pragmatic 
particles from a cross-cultural perspective, such as certainly, possibly, likely, or evi-
dently, clearly, obviously, referring also to the paralinguistics of discourse particles 
including emotions, which were the basis of the proposed 3D model of modality.
6. Conclusions
This article discusses the place of modality as a pragmalinguistic phenomenon in 
communication and the implications of such an investigation for contrastive dis-
course analysis. Since the discussion addresses the issues from the perspective of an 
applied linguist, the review of the numerous modality models is kept to the abso-
lute minimum needed to outline the difficulties posed by their single-dimensional 
structure, which generates a certain ambiguity in the scientific community.
As an alternative, I propose a three-dimensional model of modality. It is suggested 
that deontic modality be viewed as not just covering obligation, but also hopes or wishes 
on a gradeability scale. The deontic intensity of a given device would be dependent upon 
its so-called expectancy effect, that is the degree of likelihood that the desired act will 
actually be performed. Consequently, epistemic and deontic modalities, completely 
independent from each other, constitute the first dimension of the model. The second 
dimension is dynamic modality, which could interact with deontic modality on the 
prepositional level. The third dimension is represented by a new variable, the affective 
load, which seems to determine the actual realisation of the three modality types.
In the final section of the article the discussion focuses on the problems of con-
trastively analysing modality realisation. It is suggested that the wide range of cross-
cultural nuances found in modal devices reflects the gravity of analytic intricacies 
with which a researcher is likely to be faced.
It is possible that a 3-D approach to modality realisation adds depth to a discussion 
of paralinguistic phenomena as such. Yet, a question certainly remains as to the recep-
tion this approach will have. And even if (maybe optimistically) it is accepted, another 
question arises, this time regarding a possible extension of this approach. After all, it 
is likely that three dimensions are not the conceptual peak of modeling in the world 
of pragmalinguistics.
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